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THE UNFAIRNESS OF THE
MISNAMED “FAIRNESS FOR ALL” ACT
Ryan T. Anderson1 and Robert P. George2
Intransigence is a vice, but there is no virtue in accepting bad
compromises. The “Fairness for All” legislation is a bad compromise—and as a
result, would be a misguided response to the Supreme Court’s Bostock decision. To
show this is not to question the good faith of the bill’s advocates, with whom we
have been in friendly dialogue for years.3 It’s merely to note that despite the
undoubted goodwill of the bill’s proponents (and despite its name), the bill is
grievously unfair. Its protections for religious liberty are insufficient. And they
come at the price of legally enshrining a misguided sexual and gender ideology—
which would license officials to punish citizens who dissent from secular
progressive orthodoxy.4
These costs are unsurprising: from the start, the compromise sought was
misframed in two ways.
First, there was a woeful mismatch in ambitions: The “conservative” side failed
even to seek protections for many crucial interests apart from religious liberty that
are imperiled by the bill’s antidiscrimination component. As Stewart and Schaerr
stress, FFA is narrowly focused on “religious liberty and LGBTQ rights”5 as the
result of “negotiations between conservative religious groups and LGBTQ rights
groups”6 designed to protect “their core interests.”7 But religious freedom isn’t the
only interest here. What about women’s and girls’ privacy, safety, and equality, or
the wellbeing of children with gender dysphoria? FFA’s approach is narrow and
selective. A sound approach would be inclusive and holistic, considering all of the
interests and people who would be harmed by the proposed changes to civil rights
law.
1 Ryan T. Anderson is the William E. Simon Senior Research Fellow in American Principles and Public
Policy at The Heritage Foundation and the St. John Paul II Teaching Fellow in Social Thought at the
University of Dallas.
2 Robert P. George is McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the James Madison
Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University.
3 We have also joined the academic discussions: Both of us participated in a 2017 conference on FFA at
Yale Law School, and one of us contributed a chapter critiquing its approach to the book cited by Stewart and
Schaerr. See Ryan T. Anderson, Challenges to True Fairness for All: How SOGI Laws are Unlike Civil
Liberties and Other Nondiscrimination Laws and How to Craft Better Policy and Get Nondiscrimination Laws
Right, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND 361 (William
Eskridge, Jr. and Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370373.
4 Ryan T. Anderson, Shields, Not Swords, 35 NAT’L AFF. 74 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3141908.
5 Chris Stewart & Gene Schaerr, Why Conservative Religious Organizations and Believers Should Support
the Fairness for All Act, 46 J. LEGIS. 134, 138 (2020).
6 Id.
7 Id.
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Second, while the compromise purports to allow both sides to “live and let
live,”8 it does not and could not do that, because only one side of the deal involves a
form of legal freedom; the other side involves a form of legal coercion. By
definition, antidiscrimination laws coerce some citizens on behalf of others—
whereas religious liberty limits government to protect the personal freedom of all.
Antidiscrimination policies—sometimes justifiably, to be sure—use legal force to
make some people, in some domains, live by the majority’s values; religious liberty
protects everyone’s interest in living by his or her own convictions. Pairing a
coercive norm with a liberty exception is not live and let live. A true live-and-letlive approach would leave LGBTQ-identifying people free to live by their beliefs,
but not “free” to use legal mechanisms to force others to act as if they shared those
beliefs.
Elevating “sexual orientation and gender identity” to a protected class in the
Civil Rights Act isn’t about “live and let live” at all. It’s about legally enforcing
new norms of sexuality nationwide, with limited “spaces” of freedom for some
religious actors. FFA effectively helps brand alternatives to the favored ideology as
bigotry while carving out a limited “right to discriminate” for some “bigots.” This
will do harm that Stewart and Schaerr fail to grapple with—harm to people’s
privacy, safety, equality, and physical and mental wellbeing, along with forms of
liberty—not just for believers, but for all dissenters from progressive gender
ideology.9
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock will undoubtedly impose some—though
perhaps not all—of these harms on the nation. (We say perhaps not all because the
Court’s simplistic logic on “sex” discrimination does not directly add SOGI to all of
our civil rights laws, and therefore many questions remain.10) Any effective
response to the Court’s ruling needs to focus not solely on religious liberty, but on
the substantive harms that could come. This means we need legislation that clarifies
what does, and what does not, constitute unlawful “discrimination” on these issues.
A Better Approach
Stewart and Schaerr observe that “[v]enerable religious beliefs regarding
marriage, family, gender, and sexuality are routinely denounced as ignorance and
even dangerous bigotry.”11 They rightly fear that these beliefs may be subject to the
“[l]egal and social forces” that we use to “punish racist expressions and practices
severely.”12 But they don’t see that FFA would contribute to this disturbing trend.

Id.
Ryan T. Anderson, A Brave New World of Transgender Policy, 41 HARV. J. OF L. AND PUB.POL’Y 1
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113625.
10 Ryan T. Anderson, The Simplistic Logic of Justice Neil Gorsuch’s Account of Sex Discrimination,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2020, 1:28PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-the-simplisticlogic-of-justice-neil-gorsuchs-account-of-sex-discrimination/.
11 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 139.
12 Id. at 147.
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Under FFA, acting on what we and Stewart and Scherr hold to be true beliefs about
sexuality would be legally viewed as “discrimination.”
Stewart and Schaerr write that FFA “will certainly teach that unjust
discrimination against LGBT persons is unlawful and wrong.”13 But the bill never
begins to distinguish unjust discrimination from valid and honorable dissent from
progressive ideology. FFA leaves its central term—“discrimination”—to the whims
of government agencies and judges. And we’ve seen how officials interpret and
apply these policies: men who identify as women must be allowed in women-only
spaces, boys who identify as girls must be allowed to compete in the girls’ athletic
competitions, healthcare plans must pay for gender-transition procedures, doctors
and hospitals must perform them, adoption agencies may not seek only married
moms and dads to care for children in need, and wedding professionals must lend
their talents to same-sex “weddings.” No one can claim ignorance of these unjust
applications. We need policy that challenges these changes, rather than “regularizes
and refines” them, as Stewart and Schaerr admit FFA does.
It is particularly odd for Stewart and Schaerr to complain that conservatives
“oppose any compromise with the LGBT community on the hope they can hold out
forever”14 when one of us, a senior research fellow at the country’s largest
conservative public policy institution, has proposed a better approach to these
questions.15 We don’t oppose compromise, only bad compromises. Stewart and
Schaerr charge conservatives with indulging a “dangerous fantasy,” but it’s a
fantasy to think that making “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” protected
classes will promote “live and let live,” not coercion and harassment.
A better approach, especially in light of the Court’s Bostock decision, would
carefully consider the needs of LGBT-identifying people that require a policy
response, and then target legislation at serving those needs. It would explicitly
define what’s unlawful and protect everyone’s freedom to engage in legitimate
actions based on the convictions that we are created male and female and that male
and female are created for each other. It would protect parental rights, women’s
privacy and safety, medical professionals’ conscience rights, and the free speech
and religious liberty rights of wedding vendors and other professionals. This would
leave all Americans free to act on their convictions.
We find it peculiar—indeed, disturbing—that Stewart and Schaerr claim that a
“bill that protected every religious person or interest from any burden occasioned by
LGBTQ rights would largely neuter the bar on SOGI discrimination.”16 This
suggests that what religious objectors seek is the freedom to violate people’s
genuine rights, rather than the freedom to live by honorable beliefs. Truly fair
legislation would not burden any honorable activity by religious actors—and nonreligious actors. Fair legislation would prohibit unjust discrimination while not
burdening good actions by clarifying what does and does not constitute unjust
discrimination.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 139.
15 Anderson, supra note 3.
16 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 157.
13
14
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Consider a parallel. When Congress passed Title IX’s ban on sex-based
discrimination in education, the implementing regulations clarified that sex-specific
housing, bathrooms, and locker rooms are not unlawful discrimination. This was
not a carve-out for religious entities; all institutions could have sex-specific
facilities, because doing so is not invidiously discriminatory at all. Likewise with
abortion: in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, the Supreme Court
resolutely rejected the idea that pro-lifers commit invidious discrimination against
women: “Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are
common and respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of, or
condescension toward (or indeed any view at all concerning), women.”17
Thus, local, state, and federal laws were enacted to protect pro-lifers’ rights:
The Church and Weldon Amendments have protected pro-life medical personnel
refusing to perform or assist with abortions, and the Hyde Amendment and Mexico
City policy have prevented taxpayer funding of abortion. Antidiscrimination law
was not used to brand pro-life citizens as bigots subject only to exemptions for
certain religious institutions.
Here, too, in the wake of Bostock any truly fair legislation would make explicit
that it’s lawful to act on the convictions that we are created male and female, and
that male and female are created for each other—for example, by supporting
marriage as the conjugal union of husband and wife. Likewise, a fair bill would
expressly provide that no institution has to let males compete against females in
sports or use women-only locker-rooms and shelters. It would explicitly say that no
physician has to engage in so-called “gender-affirming” care, and that no child can
be denied assistance with accepting and identifying with his or her body. These
measures would protect genuine human interests, not merely specialized religious
interests.
FFA is the opposite of clear on these points. Over and over, the protections for
“LGBTQ rights” are bold and explicit, and those for “religious liberty” are
convoluted and implicit. Thus, it takes Stewart and Schaerr over 5,000 words to
explain how FFA would protect adoption agencies that believe children deserve
both a mom and a dad. And on wedding vendors, Stewart and Schaerr actually say
that FFA’s “drafters . . . had a choice whether to ignore the issue, expressly address
it, or use structural mechanisms to address it without calling it out,” and “chose the
latter.”18
The obfuscation guarantees extensive litigation—and the results are anyone’s
guess, especially with a Court as unreliable as the Bostock court. That is legislative
malpractice. And it ensures that the teaching function of FFA is not what they hope.
It will not promote public support for religious liberty. It will effectively teach that
religious people “discriminate”—the kind of thing practiced and supported by
bigots—but that some rule of statutory construction gives them a limited license to
do so. This is reinforced by Stewart and Schaerr’s own discussion of the adoption
17
18

Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 171.
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issue: “The general rule is that any entity receiving federal financial assistance for
performing adoption and foster care services must avoid discriminating against a
prospective parent or child on the basis of … sexual orientation, and gender
identity.”19 But they propose to set up an indirect funding mechanism to do an endrun around that “general rule,” whereby an “agency that receives federal funding in
this way is not bound by the same nondiscrimination rules as an agency that
receives federal funding directly.”20 So “discrimination” is unacceptable when
funded directly, but acceptable when funded indirectly?
Likewise, Stewart and Schaerr write: “To be sure, after FFA, federal law would
teach that secular commercial spheres should be fair and open to everyone
regardless of … SOGI,”21 implying that religious spheres get to be domains of
unfairness. They repeatedly write as if choices based on sound convictions about
human sexuality amount to “discrimination,” to be permitted in a few specifically
religious contexts anyway. As they put it, FFA provides “protections and
allowances for religious spaces and voices.”22 How generous. This almost ensures
the further ghettoization of orthodox religious believers and the further
marginalization of the truth about human sexuality. In the public sphere,
progressive sexual ideology reigns supreme; in specifically religious private
institutional spheres, dissenters from that ideology can find limited respite. This is
“fairness for all”?
Gender Identity
FFA also engages in legislative malpractice in its handling of “gender identity,”
imposing serious liability without defining the offense. What exactly would be
banned as “discrimination” based on “gender identity”? Can the bill’s drafters and
sponsors tell us what that will mean long term? Can they tell us what it would
legally ban or mandate today? Advocates insist that gender identity is fluid and
exists along a spectrum, with varieties currently including “gender-hybrid” and
“gender ambidextrous.” What activities based on these statuses would get
protection? It is irresponsible to rewrite our civil rights laws to make “gender
identity” a protected class when we cannot even define what gender identity is, or
what gender identities there are. Notably, the Bostock decision did not use the
language of “gender identity” but of “transgender status.”23 FFA goes well beyond
even the errors of Bostock.
Stewart and Schaerr caricature these concerns: “Sometimes critics allege that
protecting gender identity means forced accommodation of people who will switch
their gender identity regularly, even daily, in an effort to abuse the protections for
nefarious ends. The image they conjure is of teenage boys announcing one day that
Id. at 187.
Id. at 186.
21 Id. at 198.
22 Id.
23 Ryan T. Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Mistaken and Misguided Sex Discrimination Ruling, PUB.
DISCOURSE (June 16, 2020), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/06/65024/.
19
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they are ‘girls’ so they can gawk in the girls’ locker room, returning to their male
status when the hijinks are done.”24 They cite no examples of such critics. They
should know better. When Schaerr was legal counsel defending North Carolina’s
HB2—the so-called “bathroom bill”—he submitted expert testimony from an FBI
sex-crimes specialist on how “gender identity”-based access would increase risks to
safety and privacy. Why he now joins in mischaracterizing these concerns is
puzzling. And it does nothing to clarify what legal duties would be owed under
FFA to people who are “gender fluid,” “genderflux,” “genderqueer,” “trigender,”
“polygender,” “non-binary,” etc. Even Bostock didn’t go this far.
Stewart and Schaerr note that many jurisdictions already entitle people to “use
the bathroom or locker room of their gender identity”25 and allow gender-dysphoric
males to compete in female sports. But this is just what many people want to stop,
or to prevent from starting in their communities. FFA would mandate such
practices nationwide, in all public and nearly all private institutions.26
FFA also does not adequately address concerns about medical care. The FFA
text allows doctors to provide a service or treatment “on the same medical terms or
criteria applicable to individuals needing that service [or] treatment . . . , without
regard to protected class status.”27 But this completely sidesteps the debate about
care for persons with gender dysphoria. That debate is precisely about what counts
as proper “medical terms or criteria” or discrimination. Stewart and Schaerr
distinguish28 “purely cosmetic breast augmentations or reductions” from
“augmentation or reconstruction” for “therapeutic” reasons, but this begs the
question of whether gender transition is cosmetic, or is rather therapeutic, as leading
pro-“transition” advocates insist.
Activists now draw a parallel between “transition” procedures and life-saving
medical care. Even for children. One physician explained to CNN: “If your child
had asthma and was turning blue, you wouldn’t deny them their albuterol inhaler or
say ‘let’s wait.’ If this were cancer or diabetes, we wouldn’t be having this
conversation, but people get funny when it comes to medical care when gender is
involved, and that’s harmful.”29 Gender ideology advocates argue that far from
being cosmetic, “transition”-related care is life-saving. So if you provide life-saving
breast reductions to cancer patients but not those with gender dysphoria, activists
say you “discriminate” based on “gender identity.” FFA strengthens their hand.

Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 160.
Id. at 202.
26 Stewart and Schaerr explain why: “FFA exempts religious schools from this mandate to the extent sexseparated sports are important to a schools’ religious mission. While this may be a cultural issue, it is not a
religious liberty threat.” Yes, but the decision to ignore “cultural issues” is a design flaw of FFA, its failure to
take a holistic approach to serving the good of all—the common good—and not just that of churches and
religious institutions. Id. at 204.
27 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 169 n.113.
28 Id. at 170.
29 Jen Christensen, Parents want custody to stop transgender teen having hormone treatment, CNN (Feb.
13, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/13/health/transgender-teen-medical-custody-fight/index.html.
24
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Indeed one aspect of FFA accepts wholesale the transgender activists’
perspective on proper care. FFA states that an “entity unlawfully discriminates
against a child by” treating a child “inconsistently with the child’s gender identity”
or by providing “any practice or treatment that seeks to change the child’s … gender
identity.”30 So children must be affirmed in their gender confusion, and adults may
not attempt to help them—all in the name of … fairness? That is outrageous. The
bill limits these provisions to foster children and others in the state’s custody. But if
this is what “fairness” requires for those children, why not for all? This logic will
play itself out, with parents depicted as oppressors and abusers for refusing to go
along with the claim that their gender confused little girl is actually a little boy who
needs puberty blockers, cross sex hormones, and eventually amputations.31 This,
too, goes well beyond Bostock—and serves as another reminder that FFA would
enshrine SOGI laws deeper and further into our legal system than the Court has
already.
False analogy to Religious liberty/nondiscrimination
Stewart and Schaerr defend FFA’s structure and pedagogical impact with a
flawed analogy to religious liberty and to religious antidiscrimination laws (they are
not always clear on the distinction). On religious liberty, they write: “When for
example an organization of Southern Baptists or other evangelical Christians
supports the right of Jews and Seventh-day Adventists to worship on Saturday, no
one seriously thinks they are somehow weakening their own theological
commitment to Sunday worship.”32 That is correct. The Southern Baptists are
acting for the sake of religious liberty, a real human right. But nothing similar is
true in the SOGI context: there is no “sexual self-definition” or “erotic freedom”
human right.
And here again, Stewart and Schaerr miss the point we opened with, about the
difference between guarding all people from governmental coercion, and allowing
people to enlist the government in coercing others.33 Religious liberty laws say that
Orthodox Jews have the right to be authentically Jewish, Latter-day Saints to be
LDS, Muslims to be Muslim, etc. But SOGI laws require other people to perform
actions that endorse, support, and facilitate sexual practices and self-identities they
do not believe in. These laws aren’t about allowing “people to act in ways that
others disagree with,”34 as Stewart and Schaerr write; instead they force those who
disagree into complying with the beliefs of others. Just ask Jack Phillips. Or
Baronelle Stutzman. Or Catholic adoption agencies.

H.R. 5331, 116th Cong., § 3 (3)(b)(2)(E) (2019).
See Ryan T. Anderson and Robert P. George, Physical Interventions on the Bodies of Children to
‘Affirm’ their ‘Gender Identity’ Violate Sound Medical Ethics and Should be Prohibited, PUB. DISCOURSE
(Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2019/12/58839/.
32 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 148.
33 See Anderson, supra note 4.
34 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 140.
30
31
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Stewart and Schaerr’s analogy to religious antidiscrimination laws fails for the
same reason. They write that a law forbidding employers to exclude Catholics
“does not mean that the law, much less people of other faiths or no faith at all,
endorse Catholicism. It means we have decided that religion shouldn’t be held
against someone in those areas. The same is true of SOGI.”35 If only.
They are right that bans on religious discrimination aren’t used to force
religious groups to violate their religious beliefs, or secular organizations to violate
their own convictions. For example, while Planned Parenthood cannot refuse to
hire a pro-choice Jew because he wears a yarmulke, it can refuse to hire a pro-life
Jew, even when his pro-life convictions flow from his understanding of Jewish faith
and his Jewish identity. This leaves Planned Parenthood free to make reasonable
distinctions based on its convictions and mission, even when its resulting policies
have a disparate impact on people who have a certain religious identity or engage in
certain sorts of religiously motivated conduct.
By contrast, SOGI laws are used to impose adherence to an orthodoxy—e.g., to
force Catholic schools to employ people who undermine Catholic principles of
sexual morality, or Evangelical bakers to celebrate messages about marriage
contrary to their faith, or Catholic Charities to violate its faith-based commitment to
finding a mom and a dad for every child in need.
So it is sheer, groundless assertion to claim, as Stewart and Schaerr do, that
FFA “does not, contrary to conservative critics, teach that a single SOGI ideology
governs all of American life.”36 By making SOGI a protected class, FFA would
constitute a national endorsement of a certain viewpoint about sexuality and
empower officials to punish those acting on dissenting views.
Moving the Discussion the Forward
None of the criticisms of FFA we’ve put forth in this essay is new. So it is
baffling why Stewart and Schaerr’s lengthy article fails to quote a single actual
critic of FFA, relying instead on caricatures and strawmen—and imputations of bad
faith. They say that “[r]ight-wing advocacy groups” opposed to FFA “are deeply
invested—ideologically and institutionally—in this conflict” and “may embrace and
even relish such fights.”37 We do not. Nor do we know anyone working on these
issues who does. Stewart and Schaerr give no examples. To impugn FFA’s
opponents as venal or conflict-loving is wrong, just as it would be wrong for FFA’s
critics to brand religious groups or individuals who support FFA as “sell-outs” or
“cowards” who desire to curry favor with secular progressive elites.
Stewart and Schaerr also claim that “important center-right voices in the
religious freedom community have endorsed” FFA, but they never say if any
“important” voices have criticized it. They do say that “some conservative religious
groups have harshly denounced”38 FFA. This gives the impression that Catholic and
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
37 Id. at 143.
38 Id. at 196.
35
36
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Southern Baptist leaders, among other opponents, far from raising legitimate
concerns, have offered only “harsh denunciations.” That is not true. Or fair.
Indeed, Stewart and Schaerr close with some truly unfortunate rhetoric about
critics of FFA:
The best response to conservative critics is a reality check. . . . [W]hat
is their plan for preserving religious liberty from the threat of laws like the
Equality Act? Deny the threat, hoping for legislative gridlock forever
despite tectonic shifts in public opinion? Hope the public grows tired of
LGBT rights and the whole issue just goes away? More one-sided religious
freedom bills or bathroom bills, so more states can be firebombed in the
media and boycotted by corporate America as anti-LGBTQ? Sweeping
exemptions for everyone who might be inclined to discriminate, so the
SOGI nondiscrimination rule applies only to those who never would in the
first place? Trust the Supreme Court to hand out exemptions to anyone
who wants one?39
Religious and policy organizations opposing FFA have not done so out of
ignorance, a failure to grapple with reality, or a perverse attraction to conflict. They
have opposed it—as we have—because they judge it misguided.
Religious communities are concerned with transcendent matters, but most also
seek to promote the temporal common good. Doing so in a culture so often hostile
to authentic flourishing is not easy. We would never accuse supporters of FFA of
seeking to save face or win liberal media accolades. They are doing what they
believe to be in the public interest. But so are groups who find FFA’s selective
focus and structural flaws unacceptable.
Only the truth can promote authentic flourishing and peace. Faith and
reconciliation detached from the truth are counterfeits. While we work to find a
way of addressing legal and cultural conflicts that is fair for all, we must not allow
the truth to be treated in law as the law treats bigotry, or to surrender vital principles
of public policy that are central to the common good.
In the aftermath of the Court’s Bostock decision, we need to define explicitly
what sort of conduct counts as unlawful, while also protecting everyone’s freedom
to engage in legitimate actions based on the convictions that we are created male
and female and that male and female are created for each other. Religious liberty is
an important human right, but we must also protect parental rights, women’s
privacy and safety, and medical professionals’ conscience rights. We must refuse to
impose a misguided gender ideology on the nation. This holistic and inclusive
approach would achieve true fairness for all.

39

Id. at 206.

